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Abstract Social cohesion theory is tested using data on ethnic intermarriage in former
Yugoslavia. Before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the proportion of marriages outside the
own ethnic group was generally low, but in this respect large differences among the groups
existed. The proportion of mixed marriages with a Serbian partner was much higher among
the Montenegrins and Hungarians than among the Muslims, Slovenes, or Albanians. The
ﬁndings are largely in line with the predictions of social cohesion theory that intermarriage
reducestheprobabilityofviolentconﬂictamongsocialgroups.Besidesproportionsofmixed
marriages, loglinear parameters are presented. These parameters show that percentages not
always give a good indication of the social distances among groups. The boundaries of the
largest ethnic groups, the Serbians and Croatians, were less closed than their rather low
intermarriage rates suggested. The social distance between the Hungarians and the Serbians,
on the other hand, was larger than expected on the basis of their intermarriage rates. The
ﬁndings stress the importance of including information on ethnically mixed marriages into
models of ethnological monitoring and early warning systems for ethnic conﬂicts.
Keywords Ethnic intermarriage  Yugoslavia  Social cohesion  Social distance 
Conﬂict
1 Introduction
During the tragic ethnic wars of the 1990s in the republics of former Yugoslavia, the media
regularly paid attention to the existence of mixed marriages between members of the ethnic
groups that were so heavily ﬁghting against each other. In such media reports generally
detailed information was given about the situation of one (or a small number of) mixed
couple(s), but generally no ﬁgures were presented on the total number of ethnically mixed
marriages in the country. Therefore, no insight was given in the degree to which such
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riage is an important indicator of the quality of the relationships among groups in a society.
Information on the strength of the intermarriage tendency among the ethnic groups in
former Yugoslavia might learn us how good or bad the relationships among these groups
were in the period before the disintegration of the country. In addition, such information
could be used to test sociological integration theories.
In the sociological literature, the existence of mixed marriages between the members of
groups in a society is generally expected to reduce the probability of violent conﬂicts
among those groups and to increase the social cohesion of that society (for example,
Merton 1941; Blau and Schwartz 1984;G u ¨ndu ¨z-Hos ¸go ¨r and Smits 2002; Monden and
Smits 2005). From the perspectives of these theories, the Yugoslav ethnic conﬂicts would
be much more difﬁcult to comprehend if intermarriage was common among the members
of the ethnic groups who have been ﬁghting so heavily against each other, than if inter-
marriage was rare among these groups. Studying ethnic intermarriage in former Yugo-
slavia, therefore, might contribute to the improvement of sociological theories in this area.
Such an analysis might also produce information which might be helpful in deﬁning
potential ethnic conﬂict areas in the world and developing models for ‘‘ethnological
monitoring’’ and ‘‘early warning’’ for ethnic conﬂicts in multi-ethnic societies (Davis and
Gurr 1998; Verstegen 1999; Austin 2003).
In the literature on ethnic intermarriage in Yugoslavia written during the Communist
period, the impression was raised that intermarriage was a rather common phenomenon in
this country, and that the number of mixed marriages was increasing (Bromlei and Kas-
huba 1982; Petrovic 1986; Rieff 1995). However, this impression was challenged by Botev
(1994). On the basis of data from the Yugoslav population administration, Botev shows
that only about 12% of the marriages which were concluded in Yugoslavia between 1961
and 1989 was mixed with regard to the ethnic backgrounds of the partners. This percentage
varied somewhat among the Yugoslav republics, from 5% in Kosovo to 28% in Vojvodina,
and—most importantly—it remained at about the same level in the decades before the
breakdown of Yugoslavia. Besides presenting intermarriage percentages for the Yugoslav
republics, Botev also performs a loglinear analysis which gives additional information
about intermarriage preferences. The loglinear parameters showed that the preference for a
marriage outside the own ethnic group was generally low, and that the Serbians and
Croatians in this respect were the most open groups.
The ﬁndings of Botev do not give much insight in the validity of social cohesion theory.
The percentages he presents are for the republics as a whole and not for separate ethnic
groups. Because most republics are inhabited by more than two ethnic groups, and the
members of most ethnic groups are spread out over several republics, these percentages do
not say very much about the intermarriage tendencies of separate ethnic groups. Botev’s
loglinear parameters do give information about separate ethnic groups, but only about the
tendency to marry within the own ethnic group. Precise information about ‘‘whom marries
whom’’ for individuals marrying outside their ethnic group is lacking in his paper.
The ﬁgures presented in the current paper give more insight in the validity of social
cohesion theory, because they apply both to marriages within and between speciﬁc ethnic
groups. To ﬁnd out whether and to what extent the events in former Yugoslavia support or
refute social cohesion theory, we compare the intermarriage tendencies of ethnic groups
which, in the period since the breakdown of Yugoslavia, did and the groups which did not
ﬁght against each other. Because the Serbians played a central role in most of the violent
conﬂicts, special attention is paid to the mixed marriages in which one of the partners has
the Serbian nationality.
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existed between members of the main ethnic groups and the Serbians. Because part of
these marriages were concluded long before 1981, these Census data are less ﬁtted to
indicate the strength of the tendency toward intermarriage at a certain point in time.
Therefore, we will also re-analyze the data used by Botev on the ethnic groups of spouses
for all marriages that were concluded in the years 1962, 1971, 1980, and 1989. To gain
more insight in the strength of the tendency to marry within the own ethnic group and of
the tendency to marry with a Serbian partner, we will also present loglinear parameters.
Throughout this paper we will use the term (ethnic) homogamy for the tendency to
marry within the own (ethic) group. Furthermore, ethnic groups of which a large(r) part of
the members tends to marry outside the own group will be called (more) open, and ethnic
groups where a small(er) part of the members tends to do this (more) closed.
2 Historical Background
Ethnic tensions have plagued former Yugoslavia since its foundation as an independent
state in 1918, after the collapse of the Austrian–Hungarian and Ottoman empires. In the
new state, the nineteenth century Serbian and Croatian dream of a union of South Slaves
could ﬁnally be realized. However, the nation was heavily dominated by the Serbians. As
largest ethnic group and allies of the winners of World War I, they had got disproportionate
control over the Yugoslav state. The resulting tensions between Serbs and Croats reached a
peak during World War II, when the Germans occupied the country and part of the Croats
allied with them to establish their independent ‘Ustasha’ state, where they exercised a reign
of terror and killed over 300,000 Serbs. In response to the oppression, two signiﬁcant
resistance movements developed, Serbian ‘Chetniks’ who aimed to establish a ‘greater
Serbia’ and communist Partisans, controlled by the communist leader Tito.
After the defeat of the Germans, Tito established the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, as a ‘‘federation of equal nations’’ led by a centralized government, the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) (Sekulic et al. 1994). In spite of severe atrocities
perpetrated by all sides during the war, the decades after World War II were relatively
peaceful (Anderson 1995). The Tito regime addressed the ethnic sentiments by providing
legal guarantees for the use of one’s language and other aspects of national identity, while
it at the same time tried to prevent the transference of the emotional ethnic ties to the new
generation. This was done, for instance, by reducing the autonomy of the churches and
bringing back the role of religion in the expression of ethnic character (Seroka 1992: 577).
The government expected that modernization of the country would reduce the inﬂuence of
ethnic sentiments (Hodson et al. 1994). Industrialization would replace solidarity based on
ethnicity by solidarity based on class identity (Seroka 1992).
However, although the country experienced rapid modernization, accompanied by
increased geographic mobility, urbanization and a general rise of the level of schooling, the
deep-rooted inﬂuence of traditional ethnic and nationalist sentiments was not overcome.
No broadly based sense of Yugoslav identity emerged (Simic 1991). Over time, the central
government weakened and the power of the communist state bureaucracies in the republics
increased (Hodson et al. 1994). The policies aimed at establishing worker self-management
during the 1950s strengthened the local party bureaucracies at the cost of the central
leadership (Schierup 1991). In the following years, more and more inﬂuence was trans-
ferred to the republican communist parties. A milestone in this decentralization process
was the new constitution of 1974, by which the power of the republics and their political
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early 1980s increased the economic gap between the more and less developed republics
(Jovic 2001) and strengthened the centrifugal forces. Especially after the death of Tito in
1980, the powerless center was not able to resolve interregional conﬂicts and prevent them
to acquire ethnic meaning (Burg 1983; Vejvoda 2004). The country quickly dissolved and
after the collapse of communism in 1989–1990 the centrifugal forces got so much
momentum that the country fell apart. Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally declared them-
selves independent on 25 June 1991. Immediately after this declaration the Yugoslav wars
started.
3 Ethnic Intermarriage
In the sociological literature, the use of intermarriage as an indicator of the position of
groups in society has a long tradition. Especially in the US much has been published about
this subject. Sociologists like Merton (1941), Gordon (1964) and Blau (1977), (Blau and
Schwartz 1984) consider the study of intermarriage as an important way to gain insight in
the structure of ethnic and racial relationships. The existence of many marriages between
the members of immigrant groups and members of groups that live already for several
generations in a country has rather generally been considered to be an indication of
integration and assimilation (e.g. Drachsler 1921; Gordon 1964; Alba and Golden 1986;
Pagnini and Morgan 1990). In the course of the twentieth century, many empirical studies
on intermarriage in the US have been published which, among others, show that in the
decades after World War II the tendencies toward intermarriage with regard to national
origin (Alba and Golden 1986; Lieberson and Waters 1988; Pagnini and Morgan 1990;
Qian and Lichter 2001; Rosenfeld 2002), religion (Johnson 1980; Kalmijn 1991) and race
(Schoen and Wooldredge 1989; Kalmijn 1993; Qian 1997; Qian and Cobas 2004) have
increased.
In recent decades, there also was an increase in the number of studies on ethnic
intermarriage for other countries than the US. In part, these studies were directed toward
the position of ethnic groups in multi-ethnic societies, like, for example, Israel (Shavit and
Stier 1994), Taiwan (Tsai 1996; Lu and Wong 1998), Singapore (Lee 1988), Turkey
(Gu ¨ndu ¨z-Hos ¸go ¨r and Smits 2002), and Latvia (Monden and Smits 2005). In addition,
mixed marriages have been used to gain insight in the position of immigrants in traditional
immigrant societies, like Australia (Jones 1991; Meng and Gregory 2005) and Canada
(Jansen 1982; Kalbach 2002), and in new immigrant societies like England (Coleman
1985), France (Munoz-Perez and Tribalat 1984), and the Netherlands (Van Tubergen and
Maas 2007). In general, these studies reveal rather strong tendencies toward ethnic
homogamy in these countries.
Relatively little is known about intermarriage among the ethnic groups in Eastern
European countries. Although it sometimes has been suggested that ethnic intermarriage
might reduce the probability of ethnic conﬂicts in these regions (e.g. WRR 1995, p. 34), it
is difﬁcult to ﬁnd empirical evidence for this notion in the literature. Besides the studies on
Yugoslavia, which were mentioned in the Sect. 1 of this paper, there is a recent paper on
intermarriage in Latvia (Monden and Smits 2005) which shows that before independence
from Soviet Union intermarriage between Latvians and Russians was quite high (16%) and
an earlier paper on former Czechoslovakia (Boguszak and Bozon 1989) which shows that
in 1984 there were very few marital relationships between Czechs, Slovaks, and
Hungarians (p. 208). The authors of this last paper did not discuss the possible
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this article, it could hardly be foreseen that Czechoslovakia would fall apart along ethnic
lines.
4 Social Distance and Social Cohesion
The number of marriages between the members of different groups in a society holds
information about the nature of the contacts between those groups. If there are many
marital ties between the members of different groups, there must also be other social
contacts—like friendships—between them. Furthermore, the children of different groups
must have the opportunity to meet each other—at school, in the neighborhood, or during
leisure activities. Moreover, if intermarriage among the members of different groups is a
common phenomenon, this indicates that the members of these groups accept each other as
social equals (Kalmijn 1998). The number of marriages between the members of different
groups, therefore, can be used as an indicator of the degree of positive of negative social
contact, or ‘‘social distance’’ between those groups.
Once there are mixed marriages among the members of different groups, another aspect
of intermarriage starts to play a role: its function as a connecting element in a society.
Mixed marriages not only link together two individuals, but also the larger groups to which
these individuals belong. Such marriages form a bridge between these larger groups across
which family members and friends of the partners may get in touch with each other and
new—group boundary transcending—personal contacts and collaborations may come into
existence. For this reason, mixed marriages are expected to promote the social cohesion of
societies (compare, Merton 1941; Blau and Schwartz 1984;G u ¨ndu ¨z-Hosgo ¨r and Smits
2002; Monden and Smits 2005). Blau and Schwartz (1984), for example, state that, for the
integration of different segments of a larger population (intensive) personal contacts
between persons who belong to those segments are needed. According to these authors,
value consensus or functional dependencies among the members of a society are not
enough to create social integration, but personal ties between the members of different
groups or strata are needed, and they consider marriage relationships in this respect to be
best (pp. 12–13). There is also an extensive anthropological literature about the importance
of intermarriage (exogamy) for the realization of social cohesion in societies that consist of
a number of smaller units, like clans (e.g. Le ´vi-Strauss 1969; Van den Berghe 1979).
If the conclusions of this literature are correct, to reach social cohesion in countries with
many different ethnic groups, friendship and marriage relationships between members of
these groups would be necessary. Conversely, the outbreak of violent conﬂicts between
ethnic groups, like in former Yugoslavia, would indicate that there were too few friendship
and marital ties, to bring about stability. Therefore, the situation in former Yugoslavia can
be used to test the assumption that intermarriage promotes social cohesion. If the media
reports were correct and ethnic intermarriage was widespread in former Yugoslavia, this
assumption would be difﬁcult to hold. And especially so, if there were many mixed
marriages between members of the ethnic groups that have been ﬁghting so heavily in the
last decade.
Before the start of our analysis, it is difﬁcult to say how large the number (or per-
centage) of mixed marriages should be to get a substantial reduction of the probability of
violent conﬂicts among ethnic groups. By comparing the number of mixed marriages with
a Serbian partner between ethnic groups who did and ethnic groups who did not engage in
violent conﬂicts with the Serbians, we hope to gain more insight in this important issue.
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If we focus on the social cohesion that would be furthered by ethnic intermarriage, we are
considering the consequences of these marriages. However, because we are also interested
in the social distances among the Yugoslav ethnic groups, we will also pay attention to the
causes of ethnic intermarriage. If there are many (few) mixed marriages among the
members of different ethnic groups, this does not necessary mean that the social distances
among these groups are small (large). The intermarriage chances of individuals are also
inﬂuenced (restricted) by structural constraints of the marriage market (Blau 1977; Kalmijn
1998; Monden and Smits 2005).
An important structural factor is group size. All other things being equal, the probability
of a coincidental meeting with somebody from a large group is higher than the probability
of such a meeting with somebody from a small group (e.g. Blau and Schwartz 1984).
Furthermore, the size of the smallest groups is a restrictive factor. The number of mixed
marriages cannot be higher than the number of persons in the smallest group. If there are
differences in group size, there will always be a number of persons in the largest group for
whom no partner in the smallest group is available.
Another important structural factor is spatial segregation (Gu ¨ndu ¨z-Hosgo ¨r and Smits
2002). We cannot expect many marriages between the Slovenes in the north of Yugoslavia
and the Macedonians in the south. But even if the geographical distances are small, there
may be spatial segregation, for example if in a certain region some villages are solely
inhabited by Albanians and other villages are solely inhabited by Serbians.
If we use intermarriage to gain insight in the social cohesion of a society, these
structural factors are not very important. In that case it makes little difference whether a
mixed marriage was more or less forced by the circumstances or a positive choice for a
partner from that group. In both cases the marriage constitutes a cohesion-increasing link
among the groups. When a larger part of the possible marital links between different ethnic
groups is actually formed, this cohesion increasing effect will be stronger. The maximum
number of links is reached when all members of the smallest group are married with
somebody from the larger group. If we want to use intermarriage as an indicator of social
cohesion in a society, we therefore have to look at the proportion of mixed marriages
among the members of the smallest group.
On the other hand, if intermarriage is used as an indicator of the social distances among
groups, the existing differences in size among the groups may distort the analysis. Because
more marriages can be expected with individuals belonging to a large group than with
individuals belonging to a small group, proportions of mixed marriages do not give a good
indication of the preferences for (or aversion against) a partner from a certain group. If
intermarriage is used to gain insight in the social distances among ethnic groups, therefore,
looking at proportions of mixed marriages is not enough. For this purpose, measures should
be used that are not inﬂuenced by differences in group size, like odds ratios or loglinear
parameters.
6 Data and Methods
For our analysis we use published data from the 1981 Yugoslav Census (Savezni Zavod
Statistiki 1991) and from the Yugoslav population administration (Savezni Zavod Statistiki
1963, 1974, 1982, 1990). From the 1981 Census we use a table in which the ethnic groups
of husbands and wives are cross-classiﬁed for all existing marriages in Yugoslavia in 1981.
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wives for all marriages that were registered in Yugoslavia in the years 1962, 1971, 1980
and 1989. We distinguish between eight ethnic groups: ‘Montenegrins’, ‘Croatians’,
‘Macedonians’, ‘Muslims’, ‘Slovenians’, ‘Serbians’, ‘Albanians’, and ‘Hungarians’. With
the exception of the category ‘Yugoslavs’, the other ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia
were much smaller in size. The category ‘Yugoslavs’ was rather heterogeneous and its size
and composition changed much in the period under study (see for example Botev 1994;
Sekulic et al. 1994). For this reason we do not consider this group as a separate ethnic
group in our analyses.
For each of the eight ethnic groups, we present the proportion of marriages within the
own group and the proportion of marriages with a Serbian partner. These ﬁgures will show
us the extent of cohesion-increasing marital ties for these groups. For the homogamous
marital combinations and for the mixed marriages with a Serbian partner we will also
present loglinear parameters (Agresti 1990). These parameters will give insight into the
strength of the preference for a marriage within the own group and in the social distances
with the Serbians.
7 Results
7.1 Census 1981
Figure 1 is based on the data from the Census of 1981. In that year, there were about four
million married persons with the Serbian nationality and over two million married persons
with the Croatian nationality. The other ethnic groups were (and are) much smaller. In
1981, 8.6% of the married Croatians had a partner from another ethnic group. About 4% of
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123them had a Serbian partner. That means that only about one in 25 Croatians was connected
via a marital tie with a Serbian. Still, this is rather much compared to the Muslims and the
Albanians. Of the Muslims, more than 96% was married within the own group, and only
1.1% had a Serbian partner. And the social closure of the Albanians was even stronger. Of
them, more than 98% was married within the own group and only 0.4% with a Serbian
partner. This means that in 1981 no more than 1 in 90 of the married Muslims and 1 in 250
of the married Albanians had a partner with the Serbian nationality.
Figure 1 further shows that with respect to the proportions of mixed marriages, the
Montenegrins were closest to the Serbians. About 15% of the married Montenegrins—one
in seven—had a Serbian partner. Also the Hungarians, most of which live in the Northern
Serbian province of Vojvodina, were above average linked to the Serbians via marital ties.
7.2 Yearly Concluded Marriages
The intermarriage rates derived from the Census of 1981 show how many marital ties in
that year existed among the Yugoslav ethnic groups. However, because these ﬁgures
pertain to existing marriages, concluded in an earlier time period (which for the older
people may be rather long ago), they do not show us the strength of the intermarriage
tendencies for a speciﬁc point in time. Therefore, it is also useful to look at the new
marriages that were concluded in a given year. Figures 2 and 3 present this kind of
information for the years 1962, 1971, 1980 and 1989.
Figure 2 shows that the proportions of mixed marriages among the yearly concluded
marriages, for all ethnic groups, are somewhat higher than in the Census data. This could
mean that in the period to which these ﬁgures apply the boundaries among the ethnic
groups were more open than in the more distant past. However, it is also possible that a
larger proportion of the mixed marriages has ended in divorce. In the census data only
existing marriages were counted.
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marriages did not increase at all. For one ethnic groups—the Albanians—it even
decreased. Whereas in 1962 about 8% of the Albanians married outside the own ethnic
group, in 1989 this proportion was no more than 3%. This increase reﬂects the heightened
tensions between Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo, where from the 1960s on the
Albanians became more and more dissatisﬁed with their lack of political inﬂuence and the
privileged position of the Serbian minority.
With regard to the mixed marriages with a Serbian partner, Fig. 3 shows that very few
marriages took place between Albanians and Serbians. In 1962, no more than 1.4% of the
marrying Albanians did so with a Serbian partner. And in 1989, this proportion was no
more than 0.4%, or 1 in 250. So, on the eve of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the number
of positive contacts between Albanians and Serbians probably was very low. Intermarriage
between the Slovenes and the Serbians and between the Muslims and the Serbians was also
very rare. The Montenegrins and the Hungarians, on the other hand, married relatively
much with a Serbian partner. About one in six marrying Montenegrins and one in seven
marrying Hungarians did so in the decades before the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
7.3 Loglinear Parameters
As we already saw in sect. 3, proportions of mixed marriages do not give a good
impression of the preferences of the members of an ethnic group for a partner from another
ethnic group, or, in more sociological terms, of the social distance among the groups. In
this paper we, therefore, also present loglinear parameters. For the preference for a partner
from the own ethnic group, such parameters were already presented before by Botev
(1994), who used the data from the Yugoslav population administration on yearly regis-
tered marriages for the period 1962–1989. Botev found that the preference for a partner
from the own ethnic group was lowest among the Serbians and that—in this respect—the
Croats were also a relatively open group. This result differs from our ﬁndings on the basis
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Fig. 3 Percentage of marriages with a Serbian partner, concluded in 1962, 1971, 1980 and 1989, for
selected ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia
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Fig. 2. Not the Serbians and Croatians, but the Montenegrins and Hungarians showed the
highest proportions of mixed marriages. This indicates that the high proportions of mar-
riages within the own ethnic group which we found for the Serbians and Croatians are in
part due to the large size of these ethnic groups. The probability of a coincidental meeting
with somebody from a large ethnic group is higher than the probability of such a meeting
with somebody from a small group.
In the next section, we ﬁrst replicate the ﬁndings of Botev regarding the propensity to
marry within the own ethnic group, on the basis of the data from the 1981 Yugoslav
Census. Next, we go a step further and include also the mixed marriages with a Serbian
partner in the loglinear analysis. For this part of the analysis we will use both the 1981
Census data and the population administration data for the period 1962–1989.
7.4 Preference for a Marriage Within the Own Group
Table 1 presents results of a loglinear analysis of the tendency to marry within the own
ethnic group for all existing marriages in 1981. The model contains both parameters which
control for the differences in group size among the ethnic groups and parameters which
indicate the strength of the preference for a marriage within the own group. In Table 1 we
see the parameters for the tendency to marry within the own group and some ﬁt measures
of the model. Reference group for the parameters are the mixed marriage combinations,
which in this model are assumed to have the same probability after control for the dif-
ferences in group size. Because the number of respondents in the table is very large, the
traditional statistical criterion for the ﬁt of these models, the Likelihoodratio (G
2) com-
pared to its number of degrees of freedom, cannot be used in our analysis. With such a
large N the standard estimates become so small that even very small differences, which
have no substantial meaning, become statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, Table 1 also
offers an rG
2 statistic (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, 88), which shows the proportion of
the—for differences in group size controlled—association in the table that is explained by
the model. For the model in Table 1, this proportion is 99.52%.
Table 1 shows both the logarithmic (B) and the multiplicative (exp(B)) versions of the
loglinear parameters. The multiplicative versions are most easily to comprehend. They
show how much larger or smaller the chances of a homogamous marriage are, compared to
Table 1 Logarithmic (B) and
multiplicative (exp(B)) parame-
ters for the tendency to marry
within the own group of selected
ethnic groups in former Yugo-
slavia in 1981 (N = 5.428.201
couples)
Ethnic group B Exp(B)
Croatians 3.67 39
Muslims 6.87 958
Albanians 9.05 8545
Macedonians 5.85 347
Slovenes 5.64 281
Montenegrins 4.19 66
Hungarians 4.74 115
Serbians 3.14 23
Average 5.39 220
G
2/DF 73550/55
rG
2 99.52%
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123the average probability of a mixed marriage combination, after control for the differences
in the numbers of married males and females among the ethnic groups. These parameters
have a value between zero and inﬁnity, with the value of one as turning point. A value
higher than one indicates that the probability of a homogamous combination is higher than
the probability of a mixed combination. A value between zero and one indicates the
reverse. Because of the very large number of cases, all parameters in Table 1 differ
signiﬁcantly from one.
We see that after control for the differences in group size, the tendency to marry within
the own ethnic group remains very high. On average, the likelihood of a marriage within
the own group is about 220 times as high as the likelihood of a mixed combination. The
parameters for the separate ethnic groups show that the tendency toward homogamy differs
clearly among the groups. After control for the differences in group size, the Serbians are
the most open group, followed by the Croatians. This ﬁnding is in line with the results of
Botev (1994). It indicates that the relatively high proportion of homogamous marriages
which we found for the Serbians and Croatians, is in part due to the fact that they are the
largest ethnic groups.
The likelihood of a marriage within the own group is for the Serbians about 23 times as
high as the likelihood of a mixed combination. For the Croatians, this likelihood is about
39 times as high. Table 1 further shows that also after control for group size, the Albanians
and Muslims are the closest groups.
7.5 Intermarriage with a Serbian Partner
To gain insight in the preference for (or aversion against) a marriage with a Serbian
partner, the results of a second loglinear model are presented in Table 2. This time, the
model is a quasi-symmetry model (Hout 1983, p. 25). For each combination of ethnic
groups, a separate parameter is estimated, with as only restriction that it is symmetric (i.e.
that its value does not depend on to which ethnic group the wife belongs and to which
ethnic group the husband belongs). The rG
2 value of this model 99.98%.
Table 2 shows the parameters for the mixed marriage combinations with a Serbian
partner. The combination Croatian–Serbian is taken as the reference category. This means
that the multiplicative parameters (exp(B)) indicate to what extent the likelihood of a
mixed marriage with a Serbian partner for the different ethnic groups is higher or lower
than this likelihood for the Croatians.
Table 2 Logarithmic (B) and
multiplicative (exp(B)) parame-
ters for the tendency to marry a
Serbian partner of selected ethnic
groups in former Yugoslavia in
1981
The combination Croatian–
Serbian is taken as the reference
group (N = 5.428.201 couples)
Ethnic group B Exp(B)
Croatians 0.00 1.00
Muslims -1.83 0.16
Albanians -3.31 0.04
Macedonians -0.61 0.55
Slovenes -1.53 0.22
Montenegrins 0.29 1.34
Hungarians -0.43 0.65
G
2/DF 2437/28
rG
2 99.98%
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123Most ethnic groups, show a much lower tendency to marry with a Serbian partner than
the Croatians. For the Macedonians and Hungarians, this tendency is about half as strong
as for the Croatians. For the Slovenes and Muslims it is only 20%, and for the Albanians
even no more than 4%. The Montenegrins, on the other hand, show a more than 30%
higher preference for a Serbian partner than the Croatians.
For the Hungarians and the Croatians, the impression we got from the percentages in
Fig. 1 differs from what we see if we look at the loglinear parameters. The social distance
between Hungarians and Serbians turns out to be larger than would be expected on the
basis of the percentages of mixed marriages. This indicates that the relatively high pro-
portion of Hungarian–Serbian marriages might in part be the result of the large differences
in group size among these groups. For the Croatians, on the other hand, looking only at
percentages leads to an underestimation of the preference for a Serbian partner.
Figure 4 presents loglinear parameters for the combinations with a Serbian partner on
the basis of the data of the Yugoslav population administration for the period 1962–1989.
These parameters are also derived from a quasi-symmetry model. The rG
2 value of this
model is 99.96%. The combination Croatian–Serbian in 1962 is taken as the reference
category.
The results presented in Fig. 4 are quiet similar to those of Table 2. The Macedonians
and Hungarians again take in a middle position, with a preference for a Serbian partner
about half as strong as among the Croatians. And the Muslims, Slovenes and Albanians
again show the lowest tendency to marry a Serbian partner. Only the parameters of the
Montenegrins deviate somewhat from Fig. 4. They still have a relatively strong preference
for a marriage with a Serbian partner, but, this time, that preference is about equally strong
as that of the Croatians.
The changes over time in the tendency to marry a Serbian partner are not very spec-
tacular. Among the Croatians this tendency decreases somewhat; among the Muslims it
increases somewhat; but in general the ﬁgures are rather stable. This indicates that in the
decades before the disintegration of Yugoslavia no large changes took place in the social
distances between the Serbians and the other ethnic groups.
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Fig. 4 Multiplicative parameters for the tendency toward intermarriage between selected ethnic groups and
the Serbians in 1962, 1971, 1980 and 1989. The combination Croatian–Serbian in 1962 is taken as the
reference group. (N = 670.317 couples)
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1238 Conclusions
What can we learn from the ﬁgures on ethnic intermarriage in former Yugoslavia presented
in this paper? A ﬁrst important conclusion of this study is that there were indeed ethnically
mixed marriages in former Yugoslavia, but that the number of these marriages was rather
low. Only for two of the eight ethnic groups studied, the proportion of mixed marriages in
1981 was more than 10%. And those two ethnic groups—the Montenegrins and Hungar-
ians—were rather small, so that their marriage behavior had little inﬂuence on the total
number of mixed marriages in the country. Social closure was strongest among the
Albanians and Muslims. In 1981, only 1.8% of the married Albanians and 3.5% of the
married Muslims had a partner from another ethnic background.
Second, it can be concluded that speaking only in terms of many or few ethnically
mixed marriages does not do justice to reality of former Yugoslavia. Although intermar-
riage ﬁgures were rather low for all of the groups, still clear differences among the groups
were observed. Because of the central role of the Serbians in most of the conﬂicts of the
last decade, special attention was paid to the mixed marriages with a Serbian partner. We
found that Montenegrins and Hungarians married relatively much with Serbians. In 1981,
about one in seven married Montenegrins and one in 13 married Hungarians had a Serbian
partner. Among the Muslims, on the other hand, the number of mixed marriages with a
Serbian partner was only 1 in 90 and among the Albanians it was no more than 1 in 250. If
we look at the number of marriages concluded in a given year, the differences are rather
large too. Whereas in 1989 about one in six or seven Montenegrins and Hungarians choose
for a marriage with a Serbian partner, that choice was made by only one in 35 Muslims,
one in 70 Slovenes and one in 250 Albanians.
Third, the differences in inclination to marry a Serbian partner are in line with what
could be expected on the basis of social cohesion theory, which predicts the risk of violent
conﬂict between ethnic groups to be lower if there are more marital ‘bridges’ between the
groups. The Montenegrins and Hungarians, which were linked to the Serbians by most
marital ties, merged initially rather easily into the Serbian dominated Yugoslav Federation.
Of the three groups which intermarried least with the Serbians, the Muslims and Albanians
fought heavily against the Serbians, and the Slovenes were among the ﬁrst to separate from
Yugoslavia and defeated the Yugoslav army in 1991. A third important conclusion of this
paper, therefore, is that the unfortunate events in former Yugoslavia do not refute social
cohesion theory but instead support it: more intermarriage was associated with less violent
conﬂict.
If we combine these results with ﬁndings for Turkey, where about 8% mixed marriages
could not prevent violence between Turks and Kurds (Gu ¨ndu ¨z-Hos ¸go ¨r and Smits 2002),
and for Latvia, where with 16% mixed marriages between Russians and Latvians no open
violence occurred after the separation from Russia (Monden and Smits 2005), it seems
possible to say something about the number of mixed marriages which might be necessary
to get such a conﬂict-reducing effect. One in ﬁfteen clearly seems to be too little, but one in
six or seven might offer hope in this respect.
Of course we must keep in mind that ethnic intermarriage is only one among many
factors that may play a role in any ethnic conﬂict. And also that lack of marital ties does
not preclude peaceful coexistence. There are many examples of groups living peacefully
together in the same area with hardly any marital connection. However, the reverse case, of
groups with many marital connections engaging in heavy ﬁghts seems much more unlikely.
The ﬁnding that ethnic groups with relatively much marital ties were less involved in
armed ﬁghting suggests that information on intermarriage might be a useful component of
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123models of ethnological monitoring and early warning systems for ethnic conﬂicts. For this
purpose, the distinction which is made in this paper between the use of intermarriage as an
indicator of social cohesion and of social distances among groups seems to be very useful.
If one is interested in the cohesion improving and conﬂict reducing effects of intermar-
riage, the absolute number of marital relationships is most important and it is necessary to
look at percentages of mixed marriages. The situation of maximal cohesion is reached if all
married persons from the smallest group are married to someone from the largest group.
Therefore, one should look at the percentage of mixed marriages among the members of
the smallest group.
If, on the other hand, intermarriage is used to indicate social distance—the degree of
positive or negative social contact—among ethnic groups, percentages of mixed marriages
are less useful, because differences in size among the groups may be a disturbing factor.
The probability of a coincidental meeting with somebody from a larger ethnic group is
higher than the probability of a coincidental meeting with somebody from a smaller ethnic
group. Therefore, intermarriage measures should be used that are insensitive to differences
in size among the groups, like odds ratios or loglinear parameters. Using loglinear
parameters, we found that the relations among the ethnic groups in terms of social distance
are not completely in line with the picture we got on the basis of percentages of mixed
marriages. In terms of social distance, the two largest ethnic groups, the Serbians and
Croatians were found to be closer to the other groups than would be expected on the basis
of the percentages of mixed marriages. The social distance between the Hungarians and
Serbians turned out to be larger than indicated by the proportion of mixed marriages. In
this case, the restricted marriage market of the Hungarians, because of their small group
size, seems to play a role.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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